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 Private Lawmaking in Commercial Cyberspace 
 
Eliza Mik* 
 
 
No discussion of “Law and Technology” would be complete without at least 
one essay centred on the Internet. While the Internet no longer captures our 
imagination with the same force as it did 20 years ago, we cannot assume that 
it no longer creates (or perpetuates?) multiple legal problems. When we talk 
about the Internet we must, however, refrain from the popular “Internet meta-
narrative” that often leads to superficial arguments and unhelpful 
generalisations.1 We must always remain aware of the multiplicity of the 
Internet’s technical applications and the wide range of legal contexts in which the 
term gains significance. Discussing the Internet in the context of freedom of 
speech or cybercrime raises different legal issues than in the context of 
commerce or contract. In most instances, we should avoid mentioning the 
Internet altogether and refer to specific Internet-enabled technologies or 
services, such as the web or video streaming. This brief essay addresses one 
specific issue: the regulation of online activity by means of private agreement. I 
have, however, chosen yet another term to provide the backdrop for the 
discussion:  “cyberspace.” Although we know that cyberspace only exists at 
some esoteric, conceptual level,2 I have chosen the term to pay homage to 
early cyberspace scholarship, to invoke the reader’s memories of its idealistic 
values and its promotion of separatist, self-regulatory thinking. Consequently, 
embellishing cyberspace with the adjective “commercial” seems highly 
inappropriate, if not heretical. After all, cyberspace is supposed to be free, 
permeated with community spirit and libertarian values. How can it be 
commercial?  
 
We must, however, acknowledge the changed character of the Internet and 
therefore, unavoidably, cyberspace. Neither the Internet nor the web can still 
be referred to as novel or revolutionary. Internet-based technologies, ranging 
from email to mobile apps, have become permanently integrated into our 
everyday lives. The Internet is used for professional and personal 
communications, for entertainment, for public services, politics and religion. 
More importantly, the Internet has become commercial. To explain: the first 
phase of commercialisation of the Internet was associated with the 
development of network infrastructure, the sale of networking products, and 
basic connectivity. This phase related to the privatisation of the Internet, to the 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
1 Evgeny Morozov, To Save Everything Click Here (Allen Lane, 2013) 18. 
2 Julie E Cohen, ‘Cyberspace as/and Space’ (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 210, 213. 
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move from the state-funded NSFNET backbone to the long-distance, high-
capacity networks provided by commercial operators. The second phase of 
commercialisation can be associated with technological developments aimed at 
providing new services that use the Internet as a transmission infrastructure, 
such as the distribution of digital content (e.g. Amazon, Netflix) or the 
provision of cloud-based services (e.g. Gmail, Facebook, Dropbox). More 
specifically, the web is used to access mass media (television, radio, 
newspapers) as well as many forms of digitised entertainment (films, music, 
books). Consequently, although we associate the web with freedom of 
expression and political activism, its practical role is often reduced to that of an 
access interface to online resources.  
 
In sum, contrary to popular beliefs, the Internet economy is a capitalist 
economy.3 And the main tool of regulating commercial exchanges in capitalist 
economies is contract. While we need not debate whether contract law 
continues to apply online, we may need to be more alert to its role in 
regulating online activity and of the increased range of online activities 
regulated by contract. The point made in this brief essay is simple: the 
commercialisation of cyberspace correlates with an unprecedented 
proliferation of contractual relationships, some of which govern access to the 
Internet in the sense of connectivity (e.g. contracts with ISPs), while others 
regulate access to the content and services made available on websites (e.g. 
contracts with Amazon, Google etc). Both types of contracts can be regarded 
as a form of bottom-up regulation or private lawmaking. The latter term seems 
more apposite than “self-regulation.” To explain: regulation can be imposed or 
self-adopted, top-down or bottom-up. 4 The latter implies a degree of 
voluntariness and self-determination; the former is associated with state 
authority and legislation. Bottom-up regulation can be synonymous with self-
regulation or private lawmaking. Although “self-regulation” usually refers to 
rules developed by those participating in an activity, it often assumes the 
delegation of state authority.5 Such delegation is, however, absent if bottom-up 
regulation takes the form of private agreement. It is also difficult to speak of 
self-regulation if the terms of such agreements are unilaterally imposed and if 
consent to them is largely fictional. There is no perfect term to describe the 
type of regulation encountered in commercial cyberspace. We can only observe 
that it takes the form of contracts governing a wide range of relationships, 
some of which may have no offline equivalent. If we recognise contract as a 
form of private lawmaking, we must examine its basic building block: consent. 
                                                 
3 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Wiley & Sons, 2nd ed, 2010) 160. 
4 Julia Black, ‘What is Regulatory Innovation?’ in Julia Black, Martin Lodge and Mark Thatcher 
(eds), Regulatory Innovation: A Comparative Analysis (Edward Elgar, 2005) 11. 
5 Jeanne Pia Mifsud Bonnici, Information Technology & Law Series: Self-Regulation in Cyberspace  (TCM 
Asser Press, 2008) vol 16, 6, 23. 
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Two problems arise. One concerns the form of consent, the other – the 
potential normative consequences of consent. To better understand these 
problems and to evaluate the very adequacy of contract-based private 
lawmaking we must revisit some early cyberspace scholarship.  
 
I   LESSONS FROM CYBERSPACE 
 
In their famous 1996 article ‘Law and Borders – The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace,’ Johnson and Post discussed the legitimacy of rule-setting “in” 
cyberspace and advocated a self-regulatory model as naturally deriving from 
the decentralised character of the Internet.6  While many of their theories can 
be criticised as somewhat unrealistic, we must concede that some observations 
made by Johnson and Post retain their currency or, at the least, provide 
interesting points of departure for discussions concerning the regulation of 
online commerce.  Three of them are pertinent for our purposes.  
 
First, although it is frequently assumed that the said authors advocated that 
cyberspace remain lawless – a possible conflation with Barlow’s declaration of 
independence of cyberspace7 - Johnson and Post emphasised the need for some 
laws. They stated however, that such laws should be separate and different 
from traditional laws because only cyberspace-specific laws could 
accommodate the idiosyncrasies of the new environment. Existing laws were 
enacted with the physical world in mind and thus inherently unsuitable for 
cyberspace because they did not consider its characteristics. Recognising 
cyberspace as a separate regulatory sphere would simplify legal analysis by 
creating doctrines tailored to these characteristics.8 The cyberspace-separatism 
advocated by Johnson & Post associated the lack of legitimacy of external 
regulators with their presumed lack of competence. After all, you cannot 
regulate something you don't understand. 
 
Second, Johnson and Post asserted not only that every regulation had to allow 
for the characteristics of the place being regulated but also that these 
characteristics determined who should regulate - and cyberspace was inherently 
more amenable to bottom-up, self-regulatory efforts. Consequently, they 
emphasised the importance of private agreement in regulating cyberspace and 
promoted norms designed by “self-governing virtual communities” as 
reflecting the decentralised architecture of the Internet and the spirit of selfless 
                                                 
6 David R Johnson and David Post, ‘Law and Borders – The Raise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996) 
48 Stanford Law Review 1367, 1388. 
7 See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (8 February 1996) Electronic 
Frontier Foundation <https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence>. 
8 Johnson and Post, above n 6, 1401. 
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co-operation.9 Rules developed in virtual communities were better than state-
imposed laws, because they were tailored for and by the participants themselves, 
reflecting their autonomy and competence. The legitimacy of the rules derived 
from the participation of those who were subject to those rules and who 
understood the environment they acted in. 
 
Third, an important theme in Johnson & Post’s article was the absence of 
physical borders. Borders were a precondition of enforceability within specific 
jurisdictions but also, on a broader level, served to delineate “spaces” and to 
establish which set of rules applied. In particular, borders had a signaling 
function. They provided notice that once the boundaries were crossed, the 
rules may change.10 In cyberspace, borders would not serve to distinguish 
between jurisdictions but between commercial and non-commercial spaces or 
between different communities governed by discrete rules.11 Borders also 
created context and, most importantly, shaped the expectations users had of 
their surroundings.  
 
II   20 YEARS LATER 
 
20 years later we can agree with most of the observations highlighted above, 
albeit with some qualifications. First, we can observe that the failure to 
understand the characteristics of the environment being regulated may have 
disastrous consequences. Examples abound. We can recall the overzealous 
top-down regulatory output of the late 90’s and early 2000’s, which is 
characterised by a general misunderstanding of most Internet-related 
technologies and business models.12 Consequently, many of the Internet-
specific top-down instruments enacted in that period were outdated on arrival, 
unnecessary or premature. Most of these instruments exhibit a certain 
“disconnect” between what they prescribe and what is technically possible or 
commercially necessary.13 Second, as recommended or anticipated by Johnson & 
Post, the regulation of cyberspace has in fact evolved into a complex system of 
                                                 
9 Lee Bygrave, ‘Contract vs. Statute in Internet Governance’ in Ian Brown (ed), Research 
Handbook on Governance of the Internet (Edgar Elgar, 2013) 178. 
10 Johnson and Post, above n 6, 1370. 
11 Johnson and Post, above n 6, 1380. 
12 See generally: Chris Reed, ‘How to make bad law: lessons from Cyberspace’ (2010) 73 Modern 
Law Review 6; Susan P Crawford, ‘The Internet and the Project of Communications Law’ (2007) 
55 UCLA Law Review 359, who observes that regulators seem to be “stumbling forward, 
tinkering blindly with the greatest value-creation system we have ever seen”: at 381. 
13 Eliza Mik, ‘E-commerce Regulation: Necessity, Futility, Disconnect’ (Paper presented at First 
International Conference on Technologies and Law, Portugal, 8 November 2013) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2372559>. 
Vol 23                            Private Lawmaking in Commercial Cyberspace               119 
 
 
 
predominantly private, bottom-up solutions.14 There is no single cyberspace, 
but a myriad of self-regulated spaces where rules are imposed within localised 
areas of authority.15 Some problems have, however, arisen that taint the 
optimistic roadmap painted by the authors. Johnson and Post did not 
anticipate the commercialisation of cyberspace and the difficulties of any 
meaningful self-regulation in a space governed by technological giants, such as 
Google or Amazon. Once businesses realised the potential of the Internet as a 
platform for content and service distribution, as a separate but equally viable 
sales and marketing channel - cyberspace became commercial cyberspace. And 
commercial cyberspace required more than community norms to recoup the 
investments in content and infrastructure. Once profits were to be made, 
cyberspace needed clear rules and the protection of the state in the form of 
enforceability. Enforceability, however, could only be granted to those 
relationships that carried the indicia of a contract.16 Contract has thus naturally 
emerged as the dominant form of bottom-up regulation in commercial 
cyberspace. Although contract has always been regarded as a form of delegated 
legislative authority,17 cyberspace has leveraged its role to an unprecedented 
level. Interestingly, despite the recognition that online commercial activity had 
to be anchored in a traditional legal framework, cyber-scholars have insisted 
that any external interference, be it legislative or judicial, be kept at a minimum 
as it could impede the development of “real legitimate internal governance.”18 
Cyberspace should be regulated by means of contracts but such contracts 
should be left to market forces.19 The assumption was (and maybe still is?) that 
market forces alone would produce contracts with the best possible terms. 
Users who disagreed with the norms of a given community could always exit 
and find a community with more suitable norms. This ease of exit would create 
a market for rules and naturally produce fairer terms. Of course, as it has 
                                                 
14 Egbert Dommering, ‘Regulating Technology: Code is not Law’ in Egbert Dommering and 
Lodewijk F Asscher (eds), Information Technology & Law Series: Coding Regulation, Essays on the 
Normative Role of Information Technology (TCM Asser Press, 2006) vol 12, 10. 
15 Pierre Mounier, ‘Internet Governance and the Question of Legitimacy’ in Cécile Méadel, Eric 
Brousseau and Meryem Marzouki (eds), Governance, Regulations and Powers on the Internet 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 170. 
16 Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a borderless world (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 138; Margaret Jane Radin and R. Polk Wagner, ‘The Myth of Private 
Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace’ (1998) 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1295, 
1296.  
17 Brian Coote, Contract as Assumption, Essays on a Theme (Hart Publishing, 2010) Ch 2 (Note: 
Chapter Two is a republication of Brian Coote, ‘The Essence of Contract (Parts I and II)’ (1988-
89) 1 Journal of Contract Law 91; 183. 
18 David G Post, ‘Governing Cyberspace’ (2008) 24 Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal 883; 
Frank H Easterbrook, ‘Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse’ (1996) University of Chicargo Legal 
Forum 207, 215-216. 
19 Nicholas Suzor, ‘The Role of the Rule of Law in Virtual Communities’ (2010) 25 Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 1817, 1823. 
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turned out, most “online communities” are not communities but commercial 
relationships between those who provide online content or services (operators) 
and those who use such (users). These commercial relationships are governed 
by sets of standardised terms imposed by individual operators. It must be 
conceded that operators understand the characteristics of the environment 
better than external regulators. After all, they created (i.e. coded) the website or 
platform through which they conduct their business. The terms of these 
contracts are therefore perfectly tailored to the environment, the business 
model and, most importantly, the interests of the respective operators. As 
observed by Marsden, the “flood of private law” on the Internet reflects 
corporate interests not community values.20 The problem does not, however, 
lie in the unilateral imposition of standard terms but in the fact that market 
forces have failed to produce the diversity of terms that were supposed to 
guarantee contractual fairness. Proponents of market determinism have 
ignored the difficulties of exit accompanying the network effects of the 
services provided by such companies as Facebook, Google, Amazon or eBay. 
They have also overlooked the fact that terms are routinely ignored. If, 
however, market participants do not review the terms – the market will not 
produce the best terms.21   
 
I must pause to elaborate on the wide range of online relationships regulated 
by contract. Contracts govern not only traditional e-commerce transactions, 
such as purchases from Amazon or auctions on eBay but also the very access 
and use of many websites. We must consent to a set of terms either expressly, 
by e.g. establishing an account with a particular website, or impliedly, by 
continuing its use. We must do so even if we “only” want to read the news, 
“google something” or watch a cat video. As indicated, websites must often be 
regarded as access interfaces to online resources. As a consequence, contracts 
govern a broad spectrum of relationships, many of which do not appear prima 
facie commercial in nature. In many instances, online contracts are encountered 
in unfamiliar contexts. It may be unclear that the continued use of a website, 
or other online service, requires the formation of a contract. We must recall 
the third lesson from cyberspace: the importance of borders. While it is 
impossible to recreate physical borders online, there is a persistent trend in legal 
scholarship to demarcate various cyber-spaces: those that are open to everyone 
and those that require prior agreement. Madison speaks of the signaling 
function of borders in the context of notice of access restrictions to websites. 
As online experiences differ from offline experiences legal concepts 
“borrowed” from the physical world should be repackaged to match the online 
                                                 
20 Christopher T Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 6. 
21 Michael I Meyerson, ‘The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the 
Real World’ (1990) 24 Georgia Law Review 583, 601.  
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environment 22 Consequently, a party wishing to enforce any type of access 
conditions, such as those exemplified by website terms of use, should establish 
a “feature of the information environment that creates… a salient or visible 
boundary between open, public information and information subject to access 
constraints.”23 Translated into the present discussion, contract-based private 
lawmaking must allow for the characteristics of environment, particularly for 
the changed context in which online contracts are encountered. This dictates 
some form of enhanced notice, or “boundary,” clearly signaling the very 
presence of terms. It is one thing, after all, not to expect contractual terms, it is 
yet another to deny their existence when they are conspicuously presented.  
 
III   THE PROBLEM WITH CONSENT 
 
It is beyond doubt that the legitimacy of any rules appears questionable if they 
are unilaterally imposed. After all, the core justification for state non-
interference is the “consent of the governed.”24 Private lawmaking, or 
“legitimate internal governance,” can only be supported on the assumption 
that users consent to the contracts governing their relationships with online 
operators.25 There are, however, multiple problems with contract-based private 
lawmaking most of which, quite surprisingly, derive from the very principles of 
contract law. The latter is inherently informal, permissive and content neutral. 
Formalities, such as writing or signatures, may be required by statute in the 
context of specific transactions, e.g. those relating to land. Otherwise, 
contractual intention – taking the form of acceptance, agreement or consent – 
can be manifested in any manner. Consequently, consent need not be express 
but can be inferred from any conduct, excluding silence but including the 
continued use of a website. Contract law is permissive in the sense that, 
assuming the absence of vitiating factors and illegality, the parties can agree on 
virtually anything. Substantive fairness is not required. Courts do not examine 
the adequacy of consideration or the equivalence of exchange. If one party 
agrees to relinquish her privacy in return for the “right” to watch cat videos – 
so be it. Contract law is content neutral in the sense that the same principles 
apply irrespective of the substance of the contractual provisions. One 
exception concerns enhanced notice requirements with regards to the 
incorporation of particularly onerous or unusual terms, popularly referred to as 
the “red hand rule.”26  
 
                                                 
22 Michael J Madison, ‘Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet’ (2003) 44 Boston College 
Law Review 433, 489. 
23 Ibid 491. 
24 Johnson and Post, above n 6, 1370. 
25 Suzor, above n 19, 548. 
26 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1987] EWCA Civ 6. 
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Contrary to the foregoing, we intuitively expect consent to be express, 
deliberate and informed, not implied, accidental and uninformed. When faced 
with any form of contractual unfairness or when more significant rights are at 
stake, we recall that textbooks on contract law speak of the meeting of minds 
and of the voluntary assumption of obligations. We forget that theory differs 
from practice and that due to the principle of objectivity, the “meeting of 
minds” is not an actual requirement. We also tend to imply, somewhat 
irrationally, that “everything was perfect until commerce moved online.” We 
forget that consent has been becoming increasingly less expressive and “easy 
to obtain” for more than a century. The “degradation of consent” 
accompanied the mass-market production of goods spawned by the industrial 
revolution. The latter has, in turn, lead to the standardisation of terms. 
Assumedly, the proliferation of standard terms was made possible by the 
simplicity and informality of contract formation. Moreover, contrary to 
popular assumptions, contractual terms need not be negotiated and can be 
unilaterally imposed. This has always been the case, long before the emergence 
of the Internet. Unsurprisingly, many academics question whether 
relationships based on standardised, unilaterally imposed terms can be referred 
to as contractual.27 The accompanying problems have been described by 
Professor Radin in Boilerplate, a tirade on the aberrations of standard terms and 
the fictional character of consent. Radin recalls the traditional picture of 
contract as the time-honoured meeting of minds: two autonomous wills 
coming together to express their autonomy. She then describes the decay of 
consent, the progressive shift from voluntary willingness to fictional assent 
and, ultimately, to a “mere efficient rearrangement of entitlements without any 
consent or assent.”28 In her words:   
 
Consent seems obviously fictional in a great many transactions, 
however, and that is one reason I say that consent is vestigial. 
Consent is fictional when the terms are filed somewhere we 
cannot access, as in airline tariffs. Consent is fictional when 
almost all of us click on-screen boxes affirming that we have read 
and understood things we have not read and would not 
understand if we did. Consent is fictional on websites whose 
terms of service state that just by browsing the site, whether or 
                                                 
27 See: Randy E Barnett, ‘Consenting to Form Contracts’ (2002) 71 Fordham Law Review 627, 627 
(who observes the dissonance between contract theory and practice on the subject of form 
contracts); Omri Ben-Shahar, ‘Foreword to Boilerplate: Foundation of Market Contracts 
Symposium’ (2006) 104 Michigan Law Review 821, 826 ("On a theoretical level, boilerplate is 
shown to be a legal phenomenon different from contract. Is it a statute? Is it property? Is it a 
product?"). 
28 Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Boilerplate Today: The Rise Of Modularity And The Waning Of 
Consent’ (2006) 104 Michigan Law Review 1223. 
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not one ever clicks on the terms, one has agreed to whatever the 
terms say, now or as they may be changed in the future. Consent 
is fictional when the contract ends, as one I saw recently did, with 
“By reading the above you have agreed to it.”29 
 
The degradation of consent, next to the imposition of one-sided standardised 
terms, can be regarded as the main weakness of contract-based private 
lawmaking. We must, however, re-emphasise that this weakness is not 
attributable to the Internet or to the commercialisation of cyberspace. The 
degradation of consent is best explained with the concept of “shifting baseline 
syndrome.” Dan Pauly presents the term in the context of the ecology of 
fisheries: each generation of fisheries scientists accept as a baseline the stock 
size that occurred at the beginning of their careers and uses it to evaluate 
changes. Years later, when the next generation starts its career, the stocks have 
declined further, but it is these stocks at that time that serve as a new 
baseline.30 The result is a gradual shift of the baseline, a slow barely perceptible 
accumulation of negative changes. At some stage, someone asks: where are all the 
fish gone? But at that stage - it is probably too late. In the context of contract 
law we might ask why is consent so easy to obtain? Or: how can it be implied from 
so many behaviours that do not carry the same gravity or solemnity as 
signatures or handshakes? How can billions of contractual relationships be 
created with something as informal as a click? Clicks, or other forms of 
interacting with artificial interfaces, are always used as illustrations of a 
problem that is, strictly speaking, unrelated to the web or the Internet. Before 
blaming the Internet we must ask: what should be regarded as the baseline for 
evaluating contractual consent? Is it the informed and deliberate consent 
encountered in face-to-face negotiations between peers or the semi-accidental 
cursory consent encountered in mass-market, standardised transactions that 
characterise everyday commerce? Should we compare consent in online 
contracts to the former or the latter? It becomes apparent that the degradation 
of consent cannot be attributed to the web or to the Internet. The latter may 
have slightly contributed to the shift in the baseline in the sense that it 
simplified the contracting process even further. After all, web-based 
interactions are streamlined to the point of making consent so simple as to 
render it virtually imperceptible and thus meaningless. It may, however, also be 
claimed that online commerce did not contribute but simply took advantage of 
a pre-existing problem. Operators exploit a status quo that is the result of a 
long-term trend. The baseline shifted long before the Internet became 
mainstream. If we regard everyday commercial practice, including consumer 
                                                 
29 Ibid 1223, 1231. 
30 Dan Pauly, ‘Anecdotes and the Shifting Baseline Syndrome of Fisheries’ (1995) 10 Trends in 
Ecology and Evolution 430. 
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transactions, as the baseline for contractual consent it becomes apparent that 
online transactions do not significantly depart from that baseline. The 
progressive degradation of consent can be blamed on prior generations of 
commercially minded judges that resigned themselves to the demands of the 
market – not on the Internet.  
 
Despite its degradation, consent has become more significant in terms of its 
potential normative consequences. Users impliedly (or inadvertently?) “consent” 
to increasingly important matters, such as the alienation of rights or the 
assumption of obligations that may prove detrimental to their long-term 
interests. For example, millions of users “consent” to what is best described as 
pervasive commercial surveillance on a daily basis. To explain: the web consists 
of a complex ecosystem of vendors, advertisers, content and service providers, 
to name a few. The predominant business models rely on advertising. Money is 
made (directly or indirectly) not only when consumers purchase books on 
Amazon or subscriptions to Netflix, but also when they click on 
advertisements or otherwise interact with content. 31 Despite popular 
references to “free” online services, the online environment abounds in 
transactions conditioning access to online resources on “payment” with 
personal information. In the latter instance, the transactional context may be 
barely perceptible because there is no price indication and no provision of 
payment data. Consequently, users who want to read the news or listen to 
music consent to the operators’ collecting, analysing and subsequently utilising 
their personal information. Aside from the simplicity of implied consent, 
another problem concerns the fact that users need not understand what they 
are consenting to. Contractual consent need not be informed. It is therefore 
irrelevant that the terms (provided via hyperlink on the bottom of websites or 
“popping-up” during account creation) are never read.32 It suffices that the 
user has the opportunity to review them. This is where the differences between 
the online and the offline environments become apparent. Unlike in traditional 
offline transactions, users have a realistic chance to read online terms without 
time constraints and pressures from over-zealous sales assistants. 33  At the 
same time, however, they do not expect terms and often do not understand 
the relevance of the “terms of use” hyperlink at the bottom of the webpage. 
More importantly, websites are meticulously designed to encourage or 
                                                 
31 For a succinct explanation see Richard Warner and Robert H Sloan, ‘Behavioral Advertising: 
From One-Sided Chicken to Informational Norms’ (2012) 15 Vanderbilt Journal Entertainment & 
Technology Law 49, 57-60.  
32 David R Trossen, ‘Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and Yannis Bakos ‘Does Anyone Read the Fine 
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts’ (2014) 43 Journal of Legal Studies 1.  
33 Robert A Hillman, ‘Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard 
Terms Backfire?’ (2006) 104 Michigan Law Review 837.  
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discourage certain actions, including the reading of terms. 34 We must not forget 
that operators not only impose the terms but also control the entire transacting 
environment, which results in an unprecedented degree of “technological 
management” of users, including novel ways of manipulating their behavior.35   
 
IV   FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
An interesting picture emerges. On one hand, top-down regulators rarely have 
the expertise to efficiently regulate the online environment. In some instances, 
it could even be questioned whether such top-down regulation is necessary to 
begin with. The dangers of bad regulation are exemplified by the failed EU 
directives aimed at ‘facilitating’ e-commerce and digital signatures. On the 
other, bottom-up regulations in the form of private agreements carry their own 
disadvantages, predominantly related to the permissive and informal character 
of contract law and the increasingly fictional character of consent. If consent 
can be obtained too easily while, at the same time, it carries significant 
normative consequences, some external assistance may be necessary. An 
indiscriminate reliance on market forces overlooks the necessity to control 
private power – in our case, that of Internet giants like Google or Amazon. As 
early as 1944, Kessler emphasised that unlimited freedom of contract enables 
enterprisers to legislate by contract, often “in a substantially authoritarian 
manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms.”36 Similarly, 
Coote admitted that unless the parties are of equal bargaining power or if the 
stronger party is prepared to exercise self-restraint, freedom of contract could 
be an instrument of oppression. 37 More recently, Suzor suggests that we 
should see many online contracts as “mini-constitutions” and recognise their 
role in unilaterally shaping billions of relationships and their potential for 
subverting values. 38 The fact that contract has become a tool of shaping rights 
in billions of relationships does not, however, change the principles of contract 
law. At the same time, we may require a more discerning approach in how 
these principles are applied. The boundaries of contract-based private 
lawmaking must be influenced not only by the strict application of contractual 
principles but also by certain substantive values. It is one thing to say that 
contract law continues to apply online, it is yet another to realise how contract 
is used in the online economy. It could be argued that if contracts effectively 
                                                 
34 Ryan Calo, ‘Digital Market Manipulation’ (2014) 82 George Washington Law Review 995, 1034. 
35 Roger Brownsword, ‘The Shaping Of Our On-Line Worlds: Getting The Regulatory 
Environment Right’ (2012) 20 International Journal of Law and Technology 249, 253. 
36 Friedrich Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’ 
(1943) 43 Columbia Law Review 629, 640. 
37 Coote, above n 17, 33. 
38 Nicols Suzor, ‘Order Supported by Law: The Enforcement of Rules in Online Communities’ 
(2012) 63 Mercer Law Review 523, 523. 
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become constitutions, then both the substance of these contracts and the 
process of their formation should be influenced by principles of public 
governance. 39 The “easiest” solution seems to be the creation of rules dictating 
that consent that produces normative effects, such as the assumption of 
obligations or the relinquishment of important rights, should be express or 
more expressive. This “solution” creates a cascade of difficult questions: who 
should introduce such rule and how?  Should such “enhanced consent” be 
imposed by judges or by the legislature? What form should it take? Would it 
resemble cookie notification bars in the EU or the “click-wrap” agreements 
encountered in the US? In what circumstances would it be necessary? How 
would such requirement affect legal certainty? It must not be forgotten that 
contract law itself does not recognise the concept of “enhanced consent” – any 
external additions to its principles should be approached with caution. At the 
same time, leaving aside doctrinal purity, it cannot be doubted that some form 
of ‘adjustment’ is indispensable. The present state of affairs can be regarded as 
a mockery of both contract and of self-regulation. 
 
 
                                                 
39 Ibid; Anupam Chander, ‘Facebookistan’ (2012) 90 North Carolina Law Review 1808.  
